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The goal of this paper is to discuss why, how. and when nonlogical set-theoretic para- 
doxes were discovered. No one factor dominated the whole outlook: instead. it is argued 
that these paradoxes were not a simple and direct consequence of the ones discovered by 
Bertrand Russell and published for the first time in his The Principles of Muthemcrtics 
(1903). Q IV85 Academtc Press, Inc. 
La finalidad de este articulo es discutir el por quC, c6mo y  cuando fueron descubiertas las 
paradojas no 16gicas de la teon’a de conjuntos. No hubo un factor que dominara la perspec- 
tiva por complete; en su lugar, se argumenta que estas paradojas no fueron una consecuen- 
cia simple y  directa de las descubiertas por Bertrand Russell y  publicadas por primera vez 
en The Principles of Muthemutics (1903). (?I IYX? Academic Prer, Inc. 
Le but de cet article est de discuter porquoi, comment et quand ont CtC decouvertes les 
paradoxes non-logique de la thtorie des ensembles. On esseyera de montrer qu’il n’y en a 
pas un facteur qui domine compli?tment la perspective; en particulier, ces paradoxes. n’ont 
pas tt6 une consCquence simple et directe de celles dkouvertes par Bertrand Russell qui ont 
&6 publiCes pour la premiere fois dans The Principles of Mathematics (1903). Q 1985 .k,- 
demic Press, Inc. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
The traditional approach to studying the origin of the nonlogical paradoxes [l] 
tleats them as immediate consequences of the logical paradoxes discovered by 
Bertrand Russell (see [Garciadiego 1983, 5-291). Such interpretations imply that 
Russell’s role was simply that of a guide. However, subsequent research has 
shown that his participation was much more complicated, and that he was in fact 
cl rectly involved with the origin of the nonlogical paradoxes as well. 
Throughout, the following points will be assumed: first, that the diffusion and 
a.etamorphosis of the Burali-Forti paradox paralleled the origin and development 
&other paradoxes [Moore & Garciadiego 1981,331-3421; second, that Zermelo’s 
proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem [1904]-the assertion that any set can be 
w  ell-ordered-provoked immediate polemics (these controversies involved, at 
least, French, German, British, and Italian mathematicians); third, that the atmo- 
@here surrounding the origin of the paradoxes was one of confusion and misun- 
dzrstanding among mathematicians and philosophers. This state of confusion 
clrused some researchers to treat some arguments of others as paradoxes, even 
though they were not originally considered paradoxical. In fact, such confusion 
persists; one finds historians describing and discussing “paradoxes” that were not 
cl)nsidered as such by their creators. 
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In what follows, only the origin of those nonlogical paradoxes arising directly 
from Cantor’s theory of sets will be discussed. Others (e.g., the paradox of Epi- 
menides), although sometimes discussed in connection with Cantor’s ideas, were 
originally concerned- at least according to their creators-with other questions. 
Specifically, the boundaries observed here are the years from 1903 to 1908. In 
1903 Russell published The Principles of Mathematics in which he described the 
paradox of the greatest cardinal number (Cantor’s paradox), and elements that 
would lead somewhat later to the greatest ordinal number (Burali-Forti’s para- 
dox). According to earlier studies (van Heijenoort 1967a, 1991, two separate at- 
tempts made in 1908-Zermelo’s and Russell’s-seemed to solve the paradoxes. 
Consequently, 1908 is taken here as the closing boundary for this account. Never- 
theless, Moore [1978,307] argues that Zermelo published his axiomatization of set 
theory [1908b] in an endeavor to respond to the objections of other mathemati- 
cians to his Axiom of Choice and his proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem. At the 
same time, Moore has also shown that Zermelo was not trying to resolve the 
paradoxes. On the contrary, it was Russell who attempted this. According to 
Russell, he had already proved that all paradoxes could be generated from a single 
general one [Russell 1907, 351, which implied that it was possible to formulate any 
number of them. In the article of 1908, where Russell presented his final attempt- 
the ramified theory of types-to resolve the paradoxes, he described some of the 
contradictions (as he called them) which he intended to lay to rest. Among those 
discussed by Russell were the Epimenides paradox, equivalent to his own in terms 
of relations, as well as the paradoxes due to Berry, Konig, Richard, and Burali- 
Forti, Russell did not discuss the paradox of Grelling and Nelson [ 1908]-formu- 
lated in terms of two classes of “autological” and “heterological” adjectives- 
doubtless because it was unknown to him at the time he published his paper on the 
theory of types. Nor is there any discussion of this paradox in Principia Mathe- 
matica [Whitehead & Russell 19121, where the authors proposed the same rami- 
fied theory of types once again. Therefore, supposing that Russell was completely 
unaware of the existence of this paradox, no attempt will be made here to analyze 
its roots. On the other hand the Kdnig-Zermelo paradox-which does not come 
up in Russell’s [1908]-is considered because it was mentioned during his debate 
with Henri Poincare. 
2. BERRY’S PARADOX 
The first nonlogical paradox was the one discovered by G. G. Berry about 1904. 
He communicated his paradox to Russell by letter (Berry to Russell, December 
21, 1904; letter in the Bertrand Russell Archives, McMaster University, Hamil- 
ton, Ontario, Canada), but Russell published a modified version of it only in 1906 
[Russell 1906, 6451. Berry was-working at the Bodleian Library at the time and, 
according to Russell, he was the only person at Oxford who knew any mathemati- 
cal logic [Feinberg 1967, 1401. As far as can be determined, Berry did not hold an 
academic position when he met Russell (holograph note written by Russell, un- 
dated; Bertrand Russell Archives). 
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i.n his letter to Russell, Berry said that he was disappointed with The Principles 
a$ the articles Russell had published in Peano’s journal Riuista di Matematica 
basause he did not provide a proof that the ordinal numbers could be well- 
ordered. This point is quite important for the origins of these arguments, in partic- 
uljlr of Burali-Forti’s paradox, because the absence of a proof allowed Russell to 
avoid the contradiction [Russell 1903, 3231. Berry maintained that Georg Cantor 
haJ virtually proved the existence of such a well-ordering when Cantor had shown 
thitt ordinals of the second class are well ordered [2]. Berry insisted that “it is very 
easy to prove that the series [of finite ordinal numbers] is well-ordered which has 
none but well-ordered segments” (Berry to Russell, December 21, 1904; Bertrand 
Rdssell Archives). For this same reason, namely Russell’s lack of a proof, Berry 
wrote, “You did not involve yourself in a contradiction which I expected to find 
ydu had” (Berry to Russell, December 21, 1904). This implies that by the time he 
had read Russell’s book, Berry had already explored the possible consequences of 
denying such a principle. In other words, Berry’s discovery of the paradox seems 
to have been independent of Russell’s writings. 
It has not been possible to discover the reasons for Berry’s interest in these 
pIt3blems. There seems to be nothing mathematical published by him, and there is 
nd way of telling whether or not he was one of those “who wished to be known 
only by their paradoxes” [Russell 1899, 120; 1900, 721-a sentence Russell para- 
plirased from Leibniz. It is also important to keep in mind that Berry is equally 
wc:ll known for the way in which he introduced himself to Bertrand Russell. 
Ai:cording to Russell (and confirmed by recent studies; see [Grattan-Guinness 
1977, 50]), Berry presented Russell with a note saying, “The statement on the 
otlher side of this paper is true”; on the other side was written, “The statement on 
tb: other side of this paper is false.” Consequently, Berry has been credited with 
tl%: “visiting card paradox.” 
It is not surprising to find Berry searching for contradictions or paradoxes in set 
th:ory. Zermelo had already discovered independently and prior to Russell the 
cqntradiction of the set of all sets that are not members of themselves 131. David 
I-I! lbert claimed to have discovered “even more convincing contradictions [than 
Z!:rmelo’s or Russell’s]” [Frege 1980, 511 [41. Moreover, it has been shown that 
Russell discovered at least two of the most famous paradoxes (Cantor’s and his 
own) as a direct consequence of his complete acceptance of Cantor’s theory 
[G,arciadiego 1983, 151-167, 2471. In fact, it was only after Russell’s mathematical 
and logical formulations of these arguments that they became so well known. 
The original formulation of Berry’s paradox was the following: 
Some ordinals, e.g., o, w2, o” are definable in a finite number of words. Let us suppose that 
there is any ordinal which is not so definable. The ordinals less than this particular one are a 
well-ordered series. Hence, if among them there are any which are not finitely definable, 
there is one of these less than all the others. This least number of the class is then the least 
ordinal which is not definable in a finite number of words. But this is absurd, for I have just 
defined it in thirteen words. Going back a little I infer that one not-finitely definable ordinal 
cannot exceed another such; therefore there is at least one such; and this again is absurd. 
[Berry to Russell, December 21, 1904; Bertrand Russell Archives] 
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Russell published a modified version of this paradox in 1906. Prior to this, there 
is no indication that Berry had communicated his argument to anyone else. In 
other words, the paradox was not known to the mathematical community at large, 
nor did it play a role in the origin of other paradoxes developed before this date. 
Summarizing, Berry’s paradox seems to have originated independently of Rus- 
sell’s paradoxes; that is to say, it was not a direct consequence of the logical ones. 
At the same time, Berry’s argument does not appear to have influenced other 
researchers in the formulation of their paradoxes. 
3. THE KONIG-ZERMELO PARADOX 
In 1883, Cantor affirmed that the principle asserting that every “well-defined” 
set could be reduced to a “well-ordered” set was a “fundamental logical law of 
great consequence, being noteworthy by its universal validity” [Cantor 1932, 
1691. By 1895, however, Cantor realized that it was necessary toprove this princi- 
ple [Moore 1979, 1381. The theorem became well known in 1900 when Hilbert 
posed it-along with the Continuum Hypothesis, asserting that 2”o = h’i-as the 
first of his famous twenty-three problems. 
Several attempts to prove the well-ordering theorem were published but none 
was valid (see among others [Hardy 1904; Jourdain 1904a, b]. It was not until 
August 10, 1904, at the Third International Congress of Mathematicians at Heidel- 
berg, that Jules Konig presented his contribution in which he “proved” the false- 
ness of the theorem [Konig 1905a, 144-1471. In particular, he argued that not all 
transfinite sets couId be well-ordered. He based this upon a supposed demonstra- 
tion that the set of all real numbers could not be well-ordered, and, therefore, the 
Continuum Hypothesis itself must be false [Moore 1979, 143-1481. Zermelo, how- 
ever, found an error in Kdnig’s proof the day after its presentation at the congress 
[Kowalewski 1950, 202; Moore 1979, 1451; Konig had used one of Bernstein’s 
results on the exponentiation of alephs [5]. On September 24, 1904, Zermelo sent a 
letter to Hilbert, who was then editor of Mathematische Annalen, in which part of 
Zermelo’s letter appeared two months later (see [Zermelo 1904, 514-5161; trans- 
lated into English in [van Heijenoort 1967a, 139-1411). But in the portion of the 
letter published by Hilbert, no mention was made of any mistake in K&rig’s proof. 
For mathematicians who attended the congress but who were not in close contact 
with the circle of friends associated with Zermelo and Hilbert, there must have 
seemed a contradiction. On the one hand, Konig had supposedly proved that the 
set of all real numbers was not well-ordered; on the other, Zermelo had just 
proved that any set could be well-ordered 161. 
Soon the French mathematician Jacques Hadamard published a brief report of 
the Heidelberg congress (see [Hadamard 1904, 961-9621; see also [Bore1 1912, 
1571). Although he was unable to give a detailed description of the papers pre- 
sented, he noted one that was of particular interest: Konig’s paper devoted to the 
question of whether the continuum could be arranged as a well-ordered set. Hada- 
mard went on to say that the question formulated at the congress of 1900 had 
apparently found its answer at the congress of 1904, and that the answer was 
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nebative. Nevertheless, Hadamard said, it should not be forgotten that Zermelo 
haji recently arrived at the exact opposite conclusion [Hadamard 1904, note 41. A 
fey/ months later, Hadamard returned to the same question [1905, 2411. Again, he 
stressed that the two conclusions were contradictory. He noted that KGnig’s 
contribution was still unpublished, and that consequently it was impossible to 
did cuss, even though mathematicians were already debating Zermelo’s Axiom of 
Cli oice [7]. 
‘rhere are several interrelated points to be made about Hadamard’s note. First, 
hd did not resolve the apparent contradiction between Kiinig’s and Zermelo’s 
cointributions. Instead, he mentioned that this was not the first time contradictions 
had arisen in set theory. Although Cantor had asserted the existence of a series of 
transfinite ordinal numbers, Burali-Forti had shown that the existence of certain 
trqnsfinite numbers, with the properties discovered by Cantor, implies a contra- 
di{:tion. In fact, Hadamard was not surprised by the appearance of these contra- 
di/:tions-not because he was opposed to Cantor’s theory, but, on the contrary, 
bqcause contradictions seemed, historically, a natural occurrence in mathematics. 
titer all, as Hadamard noted, mathematicians had encountered contradictions 
when they first introduced incommensurable, negative, and imaginary numbers 
[Ejadamard 1905, 2411. 
Ironically, Zermelo and Ktinig already knew their results were not contradic- 
tary, because Zermelo had found a mistake in K6nig’s proof rendering it invalid. 
In fact, when Kiinig’s contribution to the congress was published in 1905, he had 
alj.eady modified his position, and only claimed that “if’ Bernstein’s result were 
tqle in general, “then” the set of all real numbers could not be well-ordered 
[I9;.6nig 1905a, 147; Moore 1979, 1461. This left open the possibility of future 
paradoxes, but in fact, there was none present in Kiinig’s work of 1905. 
4. RICHARD’S CONTRADICTION 
Jules Richard seems to have discovered the contradiction associated with his 
n+me strictly from Hadamard’s notes. Apparently he did not know of the dispute 
adlong mathematicians over Zermelo’s proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem, nor 
~11s he aware of the concrete formulation of Burali-Forti’s paradox also described 
bf, Bernstein and Schoenflies in the pages of Mathematische Annalen. Their de- 
sdription was based on Jourdain’s comments and a paraphrasing of Russell’s 
v8:rsion [Moore & Garciadiego 1981, 3341. 
In a letter to Louis Olivier, editor of the Revue gPnPrale des sciences pures et 
a#pliqutes, Richard described another contradiction (see [Richard 1905, 5411; 
Eilglish translation in [van Heijenoort 1967a, 143-1441). He mentioned that he had 
rdad the note published by Hadamard which contained certain contradictions 
fdund in the theory of sets. Richard did not specify the contradictions to which he 
was referring, but it is reasonable to suppose that he was taking into consideration 
the Zermelo-Kiinig and Cantor-Burali-Forti contradictions, the two mentioned 
bj/ Hadamard. Richard did not seem to know the detailed formulation of the latter, 
which supports the hypothesis that he came upon the paradoxes through Hada- 
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mard’s note, where this argument was only cited. It is important to keep in mind 
that Zermelo, Konig, Cantor, and Burali-Forti never claimed to have discovered 
these paradoxes. 
In his letter, Richard mentioned that it was not necessary to go so far as the 
theory of ordinal numbers to find contradictions: 
I am going to define a certain set of numbers, which I shall call the set E, through the 
following considerations. Let us write all permutations of the twenty-six letters of the French 
alphabet taken two at a time, putting these permutations in alphabetical order; then, after 
them, all permutations taken three at a time, in alphabetical order; then, after them, all 
permutations taken four at a time, and so forth. These permutations may contain the same 
letter repeated several times; they are permutations with repetitions. 
For any integer p, any permutation of the twenty-six letters taken p at a time will be in the 
table; and, since everything that can be written with finitely many words is a permutation of 
letters, everything that can be written will be in the table formed as we have just indicated. 
The definition of a number being made up of words, and these words of letters. some of 
these permutations will be definitions of numbers. Let us cross out from our permutations all 
those that are not definitions of numbers. Let U, be the first number defined by a permutation, 
u2 the second, u, the third, and so on. 
We thus have, written in a definite order, all numbers that are dejned by jnitely many 
words. 
Therefore, the numbers that can be defined by finitely many words form a denumerable 
infinite set. 
Now, here comes the contradiction. We can form a number not belonging to this set. *‘Let 
p be the digit in the nth decimal place of the nth number of the set E; let us form a number 
having 0 for its integral part and, its nth decimal place, p + I if p is not 8 or 9, and I 
otherwise.” This number N does not belong to the set E. If  it were the nth number of the set 
E, the digit in its nth place would be the same as the one in the nth decimal place of that 
number which is not the case. 
I denote by G the collection of letters between quotation marks. 
The number N is defined by the words of the collection G, that is, by finitely many words; 
whence it should belong to the set E. But we have seen that it does not. 
Such is the contradiction. [Richard 1905, 5411 (quoted from [van Heijenoort 1967a, 1431) 
A remarkable point of this argument is that Richard explicitly argued that he 
had discovered a contradiction, not a paradox. He even suggested a solution for 
it. According to him, the collection G had meaning only if the set E were totally 
defined; this could not be done except with infinitely many words [Richard 1905, 
541; van Heijenoort 1967a, 1431. Henri Poincare agreed with Richard’s solution 
and called Richard “sagacious” [Poincare 1906, 3051. Perhaps Poincare thought 
that Richard was identifying the idea of any infinite set as the source of the 
contradiction, and therefore that the infinite should be expelled from mathemat- 
ics. It should not be forgotten that this rejection of the actual infinite was the main 
consequence of Poincare’s criticism of Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers, as 
well as Russell’s logicism-the thesis that mathematics is completely deducible 
from logic. Later on, Richard responded to certain objections (in particular, ones 
raised by Peano [1973, 218]), and at the same time explicitly referred to the actual 
infinite as the cause of his contradiction. 
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5. POLEMICS OVER THE WELL-ORDERING THEOREM AND INITIAL 
RESPONSES TO THE BURALI-FORT1 PARADOX 
In contrast to Burali-Forti’s article of 1897 [Garciadiego 1983,5-151, Zermelo’s 
paper of 1904 did provoke an immediate and strong reaction which consisted of 
sel’eral publications opposed to certain features of his proof. Perhaps the most 
int:resting aspect of these criticisms lies in the fact that different steps of the proof 
came under attack from different authors [Moore 1978, 3121. 
1 n addition to controversies in the German and French mathematical communi- 
tieis (see [Moore 1978,312-315]), there was also dispute among British mathemati- 
cians. E. B. Hobson initiated an exchange of ideas carried on in the pages of the 
Pnxeedings of the London Mathematical Society when he published a long ar- 
tic.e reacting to [Hardy 1904; Jourdain 1904b]. Hobson criticized their attempts to 
prove that every transfinite cardinal number was necessarily an aleph. As far as 
can be determined, Hobson was the first mathematician to suggest that-because 
of the contradictions involved in conceiving of the set of crll ordinal and 
cardinal numbers -it was necessary to carry out “a further scrutiny of the foun- 
daions of . . . [set] theory” [Hobson 1905, 1711. Hobson argued that Jourdain’s 
ex@anations of the contradictions were not satisfactory, because they were based 
on a distinction between consistent and inconsistent sets-a distinction that Jour- 
dan claimed to have introduced independently of Cantor [Hobson 1905, 1721. 
Hobson insisted that one needed a criterion to decide when the set was consistent 
or inconsistent [Garciadiego 1983, 20-231, something Jourdain had failed to pro- 
vide [8]. Hobson proposed a new definition of “set” in terms of objects satisfying 
a prescribed “norm.” This meant that a set was defined by conditions sufficient to 
determine whether an object belonged to an aggregate or not [Hobson 1905, 1731. 
Unfortunately, this kind of definition cannot assure that a transfinite set could be 
onjered. For this it would be necessary to include a principle implicitly or explic- 
itllr in the norm (Hobson’s term) defining the aggregate by which the aggregate 
could be ordered [Hobson 1905, 1741. 
There were replies to Hobson’s article from Hardy [1907], Dixon 119071, Russell 
[1!)07], and others. Hardy announced that Russell was preparing a lengthy reply 
on general aspects of Hobson’s criticisms, including Hobson’s doubts that any 
nondenumerable aggregates could be well-ordered. Hardy therefore limited his 
comments to criticisms Hobson had made of Hardy [1904], although he also 
diiicussed the acceptability of the Multiplicative Axiom and Zermelo’s axiom [9]. 
Hardy accepted, at least provisionally, the Multiplicative Axiom, although he left 
offen the question of Zermelo’s Well-Ordering Theorem [Hardy 1907, 171. 
Russell’s reply to Hobson’s paper was read before the London Mathematical 
Sdciety on December 14, 1905. Russell insisted that Hobson had confused difficul- 
ties relating to inconsistent aggregates with other difficulties relating to Zermelo’s 
adiom [Russell 1907, 291. Russell identified his own concept of “propositional 
function” with Hobson’s concept of the “norm” of a set, and discussed the 
cdntradictions described by Hobson. In particular, he showed that they were all 
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particular cases of a more general contradiction [Russell 1907, 351. Russell also 
claimed to have shown that the contradictions were not essentially arithmetical, 
but were actually logical. Therefore, in order to resolve them, changes would have 
to be made in the logical assumptions used [Russell 1907, 371. In addition, he 
proposed three different logical “theories’‘-Russell’s terms-to eliminate the 
contradictions, all of which had their roots in The Principles of Mathetnurics. The 
“Zig-Zag Theory” would eliminate propositional functions that were too com- 
plex, but would permit others, such as the one asserting that the complement of a 
class is a class. It would allow a largest cardinal number but not an ordinal. The 
axioms Russell introduced, however, were quite complicated and “lacked intrin- 
sic plausibility” [Moore & Garciadiego 1981, 3371. 
Russell’s second proposal advanced the limitation of size of classes. A similar 
solution had already been proposed by Jourdain [1904b, 671, and by Cantor (in his 
correspondence with Dedekind, which remained unpublished until 1932). Within 
this theory classes like “the class of all entities” would be prohibited, as well as 
classes like “the class of all ordinal numbers.” However, it was necessary to 
admit all of Cantor’s ordinals. Thus there remained a difficulty: how to state a 
limitation of class size precisely. To cope with this problem Russell proposed a 
third solution, the “no-class” theory. In order to avoid the contradictions en- 
tirely, this theory banished classes and relations altogether. In this theory a propo- 
sitional function would be treated-by substitutions-simply as an abbreviation 
of an argument about one or several of its values [Moore & Garciadiego 1981, 
3381. Russell anticipated a number of possible objections to the theory: that 
classes seem too obvious to be denied; that one would have to deny a great part of 
Cantor’s theory of transfinite numbers: that working with the theory was very 
complicated. 
The “no-class” theory was clearly the most radical of the three. Although 
Russell at first doubted that it was the final solution to the contradictions, two 
months later he added a note to the article saying that he had no doubts that the 
“no-class” theory afforded the complete solution [Russell 1907. 53. note added 
February 5, 19061 [IO]. 
Russell devoted the rest of his article to Zermelo’s Axiom of Choice and his 
own Multiplicative Axiom. Russell exemplified the use of Zermelo’s axiom by his 
now famous example of the man who owns EC0 pairs of boots [I I]. He also stated 
that his own axiom could be deduced from Zermelo’s, but Russell not only 
doubted the validity of the general case-Zermelo’s Axiom of Choice-but also 
of his own [Russell 1907, 47, 521. 
6. KGNIG’S AND DIXON’S PARADOXES 
In the meantime, Konig kept working on his attempt to disprove Cantor’s 
Continuum Hypothesis. In order to do so, Konig was trying to find a proof that the 
continuum could not be well-ordered. His second attempt following the Heidel- 
berg congress of 1904 was made in a lecture originally delivered before the Hun- 
garian Academy of Sciences on June 30, 1905 [van Heijenoort 1967a]. This hap- 
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pened almost simultaneously with Richard’s letter to the Revue gdne’rule des 
scia,nces pures et applique’es. Konig’s aim, however, was quite different from 
Ridhard’s. The latter was very clear in describing his argument as a “contradic- 
tiorl” and he explicitly stated that other contradictions discovered by other mathe- 
ma) icians had motivated him to write his note. Konig, on the other hand, was not 
so inuch concerned with paradoxes. In the first place, he argued that the indis- 
criminate use of the word “set” was the real source of the apparent paradoxes. In 
faci , he proposed solutions to the paradoxes in two different places without going 
intqb a detailed analysis, which suggests that he did not consider them of major 
im@ortance. His first solution consisted in denying that the second number class 
(set: [2]) could be considered as a completed set, that is, “a totality of well- 
dislinguished elements that are altogether conceptually distinct” (see [Kiinig 
19()5b, 1601; English translation in [van Heijenoort 1967a, 1481). This would solve 
the Burali-Forti paradox, because a, representing the totality of all finite ordinal 
tydes as acompleted set, was effectively excluded [Konig 1905b, 160, note 11. His 
second solution, the more general one, consisted in distinguishing between the 
COII cepts of “set (completed sets) and “classes” (sets in the “act of becoming”) 
[K/inig 1905b, 1591. 
The main goal, it should be stressed, of Konig’s article was not to solve the 
padadoxes, but to show that the continuum could not be well-ordered. Konig’s 
proof was formulated in terms of “finitely defined” elements of the continuum and 
the complements of sets. First of all he gave a definition of the “finitely defined” 
eler nent: 
An element of the continuum will be said to be “finitely defined” if, by means of a language 
capable of giving a definite form to our scientific thinking, we can in a finite span of time 
specify a procedure (law) that conceptually distinguishes that element of the continuum from 
any other one. [Konig 1905b. 1591 (English translation in [van Heijenoort 1967a. 1461) 
IL&rig’s initial hypothesis in his proof was to suppose that the continuum was a 
wei l-ordered set, which he took to be a false assumption. Considering the contin- 
uum to be a well-ordered set, the elements that could not be finitely defined 
forned a subset A4 of the supposedly well-ordered set. Because the cardinality of 
the set of all the finitely defined elements of the continuum is X0, and because the 
coritinuum is not denumerable, there exist elements of the continuum that cannot 
be’linitely defined. The subset M has to be well-ordered, and therefore contains a 
first element. But if the continuum is a well-ordered set, then there is a one-to-one 
coirespondence between the continuum and a set of specific ordinals. Because of 
th! one-to-one correspondence, there would have to be a first ordinal that was not 
finitely defined. But this is impossible, because “there exists a definite (well- 
ordlered) set of finitely defined ordinals that follow each other in an unbroken 
seQrence beginning with the first” (see [Konig 1905b, 1591; English translation in 
[vsn Heijenoort 1967a, 147-1481). Konig then obtained a contradiction to the 
asdumption that the ordinal in question could not be finitely defined by observing 
that this ordinal was defined by the phrase “the first ordinal that exceeds all of 
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these in magnitude” (see [Konig 1905b, 1591; English translation in [van Heije- 
noort 1967a, 1481). This provided the contradiction, following from the supposi- 
tion that the continuum was well-orderable. Once again, it is important to keep in 
mind that Konig-as well as Burali-Forti, Cantor, and Dixon (who is discussed 
below)-did not claim to have encountered a paradox. He was only trying, unsuc- 
cessfully, to prove that the continuum could not be well-ordered. Konig’s subse- 
quent interests evolved in a different direction, but that is part of another story 
ml. 
According to some historians, both Richard and Konig discovered a paradox, 
the most remarkable point being that the two contributions “were written during 
the same weeks, perhaps even the same days, and independently of each other” 
[van Heijenoort 1967a, 1421. In addition, Copilowish claims that A. C. Dixon 
published another paradox in an article read before the London Mathematical 
Society on December 14, 1905 [Copilowish 1948, 851. However, according to 
Dixon himself, “the idea on which this article [1907] is founded was mooted by 
one in a letter to Dr. Hobson in June of this year [1905], . . . ” [Dixon 1907, 20, 
footnote]. If, in fact, Dixon had discovered another paradox, then the coincidence 
of independent discovery is all the more remarkable, involving not two but three 
cases. It is true that Richard, Konig, and Dixon each devised their arguments 
independently of the others in June of 1905. But Konig, as explained earlier, 
considered his argument as part of his denial of the well-ordering of the contin- 
uum. Similarly, Dixon did not consider his argument as a paradox, but rather as a 
justification of the proposition that no transfinite aggregate could be well-ordered 
by a finite set of rules [Dixon 1907, 191. 
As already mentioned, Dixon’s ideas were originally motivated by the same 
article of Hobson’s that provoked the polemic among British mathematicians 
[Dixon 1907, 181. Dixon thought that is was possible to find the cardinal number of 
the set of all objects that could be defined in finite terms. What did he mean by 
“define”? An object was defined, he held, when the properties necessary to 
distinguish it from all other objects of mental activity were stated. Since the 
number of elements available for use in any definition is finite, say p (including the 
symbols of all known alphabets, signs of punctuation, etc.), the cardinal number 
(or power) of the set of objects described by such finite specifications could not be 
greater nor less than No. It was not greater because a nondenumerable set could 
not be formed with only a denumerable number of elements; it could not be less 
because the sequence of the natural numbers alone already provided a set of 
objects finitely defined with cardinality k ‘O. Because the set of all real numbers 
had a cardinality greater than X0, this meant there had to be elements of the real 
number system which could not be given a finite definition of specification. How- 
ever, because of Zermelo’s theorem that any transfinite set could be well-ordered, 
each number could be finitely defined. If this were not the case, then 
there must be a first [element] which cannot [be finitely defined], and it may be described in 
finite terms as “the first in the series determined by the rules R which cannot be described in 
finite terms.” This is absurd. [Dixon 1907, 191 
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This argument was immediately applied to Cantor’s ordinal numbers and the 
secl)nd number class. Now the absurdity lay in the phrase “the least number of 
the.second class that cannot be specified in finite terms” [Dixon 1907, 191. Instead 
of E oncluding that he found a paradox, Dixon inferred that it was not possible to 
say that a transfinite aggregate (or set) could be well-ordered by a “finite set of 
rulo~s.” This did not contradict Zermelo’s theorem, because Zermelo had simply 
shawn that it was possible to provide a well-ordering of a transfinite set without 
showing how to produce a specific arrangement of the set as Hilbert had hoped 
[Hiibert 1902, 4471. 
Eussell, in his now classic formulation of the theory of types [1908], discussed 
Dixon’s and Konig’s arguments as if they involved contradictions. This is the first 
such treatment of this sort that we have been able to find, implying that Russell 
not only created some of the now famous “logical” paradoxes, but also one of the 
“semantical” ones as well. Russell transformed Konig’s and Dixon’s arguments 
intdb a simple and direct contradiction: not all ordinal numbers can be finitely 
def ned, because the total number of possible definitions is X0 and there are more 
than &, transfinite ordinal numbers. Of these there must be a least, and this is 
def ned by the phrase “the least indefinable ordinal,” an absurdity [Russell 1908, 
2231. In a footnote Russell indicated Konig [1905b] and Dixon [1907] as sources, 
but he did not mention whether either of them was thinking in terms of paradoxes 
or [lot. 
There is-and has been-confusion in the status of these paradoxes, in particu- 
lar the so-called Konig-Zermelo paradox. The terms in which some mathemati- 
cians, in particular Jacques Hadamard and Jules Richard, chose to discuss the 
cog.tradictions between Zermelo’s proof of the Well-Ordering Theorem and 
K&rig’s alleged proof of the impossibility of the well-ordering of the continuum, 
has already been covered. Another French mathematician, Henri Poincare, also 
mentioned the Zermelo-Konig “antinomy” as one of the already numerous con- 
tradictions arising from set theory [Poincare 1906, 333; 1912, 5301. Poincare was 
hunting antinomies because he was trying to discredit both Cantor’s theory of sets 
anO1 Russell’s logicism. Unfortunately, Poincare only mentioned the Zermelo- 
Konig paradox but did not expand upon or discuss it in detail. It is therefore 
impossible to know in what context he thought there was a contradiction, or to 
what extent he thought of these as contradictions-or “antinomies” as he prefer- 
red to call them. This seems but one more element in the long list of confusions 
anal misunderstandings related to the origin and development of the set-theoretic 
paradoxes. 
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NOTES 
1. Throughout this article, the term pnrudox will be used to indicate an argument that derives self- 
contradictory conclusions by valid deductions from apparently acceptable premises. The word contru- 
diction will be taken to mean “a statement containing propositions one of which denies or is logically 
at variance with the other” [O.r@d English L)ic/ioncrry. 1971, Vol 1. p. 5391. Nevertheless, the particu- 
lar choice of the usage of the words made by mathematicians and philosophers at the beginning of the 
century will be respected in each particular case. In retrospect, the arguments described in textbooks 
of the history of mathematics as requiring a reexamination of the foundations of set theory might be 
called paradoxes. We term “logical” those paradoxes described for the first time in Bertrand Russell’s 
The Principles ofMathematics [1903]-i.e.. Burali-Forti’s paradox. Cantor’s paradox, and Russell’s 
contradiction. We will label “semantical” or “nonlogical” paradoxes those arguments not involving 
logical or mathematical terms but containing some reference to thought, language, or symbolism 
[Ramsey 1926, 352-3541. 
2. Cantor defined the second number class as “the totality of all order types (Y of well-ordered sets 
of cardinality h’,,” [Dauben 1979, 2021. Berry claimed that Cantor had proved the well-ordering of the 
second number class in 1895, but in the first part of the “Beitrlge zur Begrtindung der transfiniten 
Mengenlehre,” Cantor simply indicated that: 
[w]e shall show that the transfinite cardinal numbers can be arranged according to their 
magnitude, and, in this order, [they] form, like the finite numbers, a “well-ordered aggre- 
gate” in an extended sense of the words. [Jourdain 1915, 1091 
Russell did recognize the validity of Berry’s proof of the well-ordering of the ordinals a year later 
[Russell 1907, 36, second footnote]. 
3. Zermelo claimed to have discovered, not only independently but also before Russell did. the 
contradiction of the set of all sets which are not members of themselves ]Zermelo 1908a. t 18-t 19, 
second footnote]. For a detailed explanation of how Zermelo discovered the contradiction see 
[Thomas & Rank 19811. 
4. Probably Hilbert came upon the topic of the paradoxes as a consequence of his correspondence 
with Cantor in 1895 or 1896 (Hilbert to Frege, November 7, 1903: printed in [Frege 1980, 51-521). 
5. The proposition in question is 
go = h’, * 2”a for every ordinal (Y. 
Later on, Felix Bernstein claimed that this result was applicable only in the case of finite (Y [Bernstein 
1905, 463-4641, but Konig did not specify such a restriction. 
6. Irving Copi has argued that both articles were already contradictory at the time of the congress. 
This cannot be, however, because Zermelo’s contribution was not developed until after the congress 
had finished (see [Copi 1971, IO]: see also [van Heijenoort 1967a, 4711. 
7. Hadamard probably had in mind the dispute among French mathematicians. Later on, this 
polemic was published in the pages of the Bulletin de la Sock+ MuthPmatique de France (see [Bore] 
1912, 150-1601). 
8. For Jourdain’s claim of the independence of the use of the words. see [Jourdain 1904b. 67, first 
footnote]. Cantor’s similar distinction between consistent and inconsistent multiplicities (aggregates) 
had been rejected by Hilbert in 1904 because of the lack of “a precise criterion for this distinction” 
[Hubert 1904, 1311. 
9. “Given any class of mutually exclusive classes of which none is null, there is at least one class 
which has exactly one term in common with each of the given classes” [Russell 1919, 1221. This 
Multiplicative Axiom-as Russell called it-is needed to prove that the infinite product of (finite or 
transfinite) numbers is zero when one of the factors is zero. 
HM 12 THENONLOGICALPARADOXES 349 
10. Nevertheless, Russell published another “final” attempt to resolve the contradictions in 1908. 
T’iis one was based on the theory of types, and proved to be his definitive solution [Russell 19081. 
I I. There is a millionaire who owns X0 pairs of boots and socks. It would be easy to imagine how 
many boots he had in total because K. + X,, = &,. This is easy to prove for the case of boots because 
olte can distinguish between a right and a left boot. Therefore, one would have no trouble selecting a 
bi)ot from each pair, say the left one in each case. Unfortunately, manufacturers of socks do not make 
ally difference between right and left socks. Thus there is no criterion for picking one sock from each 
pair [Russell 1907, 47-48; 1919, 125-1261. 
12. In later papers Kiinig argued that he had discovered a paradox, reflecting increasingly the 
ia tluence of PoincarC. Finally he came to accept Zermelo’s Well-Ordering Theorem. See [Kiinig 1907, 
1’)14; Moore 1979, 213-2161. 
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